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Abstract: This honors thesis examines how individuals displaced by gentrification fare
after relocation, with changes in wage and income as the primary measures of well-being.
Geo-coded Panel Study of Income Dynamics data is used in conjunction with decennial
census tract-level neighborhood data to evaluate nationwide occurrences of gentrification
and their effects on the displaced between 1990 and 1995, with a focus on whether
changing neighborhood effects can account for the change in well-being. Standard OLS
regressions not accounting for neighborhood effects find that compared to a nationwide
sample, a sample of movers, and a sample of displaced residents, residents displaced
specifically by gentrification do not experience statistically significant wage or income
changes. When neighborhood effects are considered, being displaced by gentrification
has varying effects on wage and income, and changes in wage and income, which vary
based on which neighborhood characteristic is being considered. These effects vary
greatly in their consistency with neighborhood effects theory, suggesting that analysis
would benefit greatly from improved data.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Gentrification—the buying and renovation of houses and stores in deteriorated
urban neighborhoods by upper or middle income families or individuals, which improves
property values but often displaces low income families and small businesses—has been
an increasingly common urban phenomenon since the 1950s, and yet very few studies
have empirically tested what happens to those residents who are displaced by this process
in the long run.
According to George and Eunice Grier,
Displacement occurs when any household is forced to move from its
residence by conditions which affect the dwelling or its immediate
surroundings, and which:
(1)
are beyond the household’s reasonable ability to control or
prevent;
(2)
occur despite the household’s having met all previously-imposed
conditions of occupancy; and
(3)
make continued occupancy by that household impossible,
hazardous, or unaffordable (HUD, in Le Gates and Hartman, 1981,
p. 214).
Past research finds that white professionals and single parents move into
gentrifying neighborhoods, as working class residents, the elderly, the unskilled, and the
unemployed are displaced (Atkinson 2000). While it is mostly low-income households
that are displaced, there are also a significant number of middle-class people that leave
the neighborhood (Lyons 1996). Yet many aspects of what happens to this highly diverse
but economically disadvantaged group remain unanswered.
This study uses geo-coded Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data, as have
several previous displacement studies. It also explicitly links displacement with
gentrification to look at cities around the United States, rather than only at a particular
instance or instances of gentrification, and extends from 1990 to 1995. It examines how
3

individuals’ wages and incomes change as they relocate from gentrifying neighborhoods
to new ones to measure whether individuals end up better or worse off. The study
attempts to answer why the incomes or wages of individuals change as they relocate. Is a
significant difference between past and present neighborhood effects—such as a
difference in potential role models or a difference in unemployment rates—responsible
for the changes in individual wage and income? While this is an issue that has been
addressed in previous literature, it has oft been left to the discretion of the residents
surveyed to rank their neighborhoods, whereas this study will use decennial census data
to evaluate neighborhoods.
Section II will review literature on neighborhood effects and displacement.
Section III will provide a theoretical framework and estimation strategy. Section IV will
discuss the data and the variable specification. Section V will report regression results
and robustness checks. Section VI will discuss conclusions drawn from findings.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. What are Neighborhood Effects?
To understand whether the displaced end up better or worse off, one must
understand what changes occur to them when they relocate out of their gentrifying
neighborhoods. Most obviously, their neighborhoods change. While different
neighborhoods offer a bevy of varying combinations of public transportation, housing,
and educational institutions, it must be remembered that gentrification as it is considered
in this paper is a purely urban phenomenon. Recent research has shown that a wave of
gentrification known as postrecessionary gentrification has been occurring since the
period after the recession of the early 1990s and spreading to areas away from the urban
4

cores of cities (Niedt 2006). However, this study only covers up to 1995, and will not
consider suburbs as susceptible to gentrification. Thus, because they are located in the
city center, a person encountering gentrification should have enough public transportation
options, as most cities do, so that having more educational or other institutions in their
immediate neighborhood should not significantly affect them. That is, it is easy for a
person living in a city to go to another neighborhood in the city for work, school, etc. In
this sense, it may be the difference in neighbors that is the biggest difference for people
displaced by gentrification. This concept is known as neighborhood effects, and it speaks
to the myriad ways in which neighbors influence each other’s behavior (Freeman 2006;
Lees 2008; Wilson 1987).
While this paper focuses on neighborhood effects, it cannot be ignored that
gentrification can have many other effects on displaced residents. Gentrification carries a
large psychic cost, especially for those residents who come from very insular
neighborhoods. Losing one’s neighbors, close-by relatives, etc. can be traumatic, and this
can cause a displaced family to incur costs it had not experienced before, either because
of emotional trauma, or because of, for example, the necessity to hire a babysitter when
one was readily available at no or lower cost before. Gentrification can also cause
displaced residents to feel inept or wronged, and thus cynical towards gentrifying forces.
Doubtless, there are many other sources of possible effects of gentrification that will not
be discussed in this paper, which will focus solely on neighborhood effects as possible
reasons for changes in residents’ well being.
Neighborhood effects can be divided into four categories: peer effects, collective
efficacy/socialization, social ties, and institutional resources.
5

Peer effects refers to the idea that like follows like and individuals will be
influenced by the behavior of their peers. This is most often used to refer to people
witnessing, reacting to, and taking on the behavior of individuals within their own age
group. Collective efficacy and collective socialization refer to when the collective actions
of the neighborhood are directed at the behavior of local residents or externally,
respectively. An example of collective efficacy is the idea of role models for children.
The idea is that children need positive role models and adjusting to the change in local
behavioral pathologies can affect a resident’s life (Wyly 1999). Social ties are those
connections that are sources of social satisfaction, and may also facilitate upward
mobility by providing sources of information about jobs (Kleit 2001). The mixing of
cultures and races is supposedly preferable over a homogenous setting, as it prepares
children for the many cultures that they are likely to encounter as adults, and expands the
horizons of older residents (Allen 1984). Finally, institutional resources refers to the
influence that the upper-classes have with organizations and the ability of the upperclasses to create effective community organizations.
B. Past Research in a Neighborhood Effects Framework
Lyons finds that higher-income movers in Greater London were more likely to
move farther away to find neighborhoods that were suitable to their needs, while lowerincome residents were more likely to remain near the central city though further away
from it than they were in their former neighborhood. Schill and Nathan (1983) have
similar findings when they study the displaced in five gentrifying areas in the United
States. They find that 22 percent of the displaced had shorter commutes after being
displaced, and only 15 percent traveled longer distances. Furthermore, very few of the
6

displaced relocated away from the city, as only 8 percent of the displaced moved to the
city’s suburbs or away from the metropolitan area, as compared to 17 percent of
voluntary movers (Schill and Nathan 1983). That the displaced remain in the central city
or close to their place of work supports the assumption that they have sufficient means of
transportation to get to school and work, and should not have to rely upon their new
neighborhoods for work or education opportunities within the neighborhood’s
parameters.
Lower-income residents in London were also more likely to live in enclaves,
meaning that many of the lower-income displaced from one neighborhood were likely to
relocate to the same neighborhood (Lyons 1996). This suggests that they are likely to
maintain the same social ties, which would hinder absorption of the effects of their new
neighborhoods or new neighborhood effects in their gentrifying neighborhoods (HUD
1981). One state-sponsored gentrification program in Copenhagen was meant not to
displace any residents, but to involve them in the revitalization of the neighborhood, but
still ended with some residents moving to purportedly “worse” neighborhoods (Larsen
2008). Dixon (1998) states that long-term residents of the Cabrini-Green houses in
Chicago have been forced to move into more substandard homes as they are displaced by
gentrification, but fails to cite the source of this information. In these aforementioned
cases, the displaced are encountering negative neighborhood effects, as they are either
ending up in worse neighborhoods or maintaining connections with other low-income
residents from their original neighborhood. However, it cannot be said that gentrification
caused those who stayed in their original neighborhoods to experience negative effects.
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Two studies focusing on minority migration patterns evaluate mobility between
high-income and low-income neighborhoods. They find that white households are
typically much less likely to move from high-income to low-income neighborhoods than
minority households are, though the rate of this sort of movement for white households
has increased dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s (Crowder and South 2005; South,
Crowder, and Chavez 2005). Though their studies do not explicitly link mobility with
displacement from gentrification, they speculate that this increased trend in downward
mobility may be a reflection of gentrification. This would seem to support the displaced
ending up worse off in terms of neighborhood effects, as the data find that minority
residents are likely to relocate to worse neighborhoods, though it is uncertain whether
low-income residents would be moving to even lower-income neighborhoods.
Freeman studies gentrifying neighborhoods in New York City and finds that lowincome individuals and individuals without a college degree are less likely to move out of
a gentrifying neighborhood than similar individuals in a non-gentrifying neighborhood
(Freeman 2005).1 Similarly, a study of five gentrifying neighborhoods found that over 70
percent of the displaced households, compared to 60 percent of the voluntary movers,
relocated within the same zip code or to a neighboring zip code, suggesting that they
remain in close proximity to gentrification (Schill and Nathan 1983). This may point to
the displaced still being in close enough proximity to garner some positive neighborhood
effects from in-movers (Vigdor 2001). But while Freeman’s econometric analysis
supports the idea that low-income residents do not end up worse off because they are

1

Generalizations about gentrification in the United States should not be made based on cases of
gentrification in New York. New York is a special case in that very few alternative affordable housing
options exist, so there may be less of an option to move or benefit to be gained for long-term residents if
they choose to relocate out of their gentrifying neighborhood.
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more likely to make intra-neighborhood moves or remain in their original housing than
be displaced, interviews with long-term residents suggest that there is no or very little
social mixing, so that residents cannot benefit from the positive neighborhood effects that
upper-class gentrifiers bring (Freeman 2005). As Freeman says, “Income mixing is no
promise of upward mobility” (Freeman 2006, p. 206).
A U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development report (1981) which used
PSID and survey data finds that displaced residents from the San Francisco Hayes Valley
neighborhood did not experience “severe negative changes in housing characteristics
either absolutely or in comparison with other groups.” The Hayes Valley study also states
that displaced households were more satisfied with their homes and neighborhoods after
moving, which could be a product of positive neighborhood effects within their
neighborhood (HUD 1981). Another HUD study that used PSID data found less
favorable outcomes for displaced residents, but did not link displacement directly with
gentrification (Vigdor 2002). It found that displaced households are likely to experience
significant increases in crowding and housing cost burden, but that displacement did not
significantly affect housing costs, welfare dependency, or hours worked.
Somewhat contradictory to the aforementioned findings, Schill and Nathan’s
(1983) study of five gentrifying areas in the United States found that though rent
increased (but only moderately) for many displaced residents, these residents must have
been purchasing additional rooms with the additional rent, as crowding did not
significantly increase. This study also found that 56 percent of displaced residents rated
their new neighborhood as better than the one they were displaced from, whereas 67
percent of voluntary movers found their new neighborhood better than their old one.
9

Nineteen percent of the displaced reported that their new neighborhood was worse than
their previous neighborhood, whereas 13 percent of voluntary movers believed that their
new neighborhood was worse (Schill and Nathan 1983). These results suggest that
though the majority of displaced residents are ending up better off in terms of
neighborhood quality, they are not ending up as better off as non-displaced movers. A
study that used American Housing Survey data to focus on gentrification in the Boston
area found that of the households facing higher housing costs, the majority also
experienced increases in income to offset this increase. Most households within this
group also experienced an increase in housing quality, neighborhood quality, or public
service quality, or a combination of the three (Vigdor 2002).
The results of both of these studies suggest that positive neighborhood effects are
taking place, as incomes and neighborhood quality perceptions increase, though Schill
and Nathan’s study notes that in comparison to non-displaced movers, the displaced are
worse off, even if they are over all better off. This may be because displaced movers
display lower income levels than non-displaced movers, and thus it is easier for nondisplaced movers to create social ties with residents of the better neighborhoods they
move into. This allows voluntary movers to further garner benefits from positive
neighborhood effects. On the other hand, the stigma of being low-income and a lack of
previous interactions with higher-income individuals may prevent low-income displaced
movers from establishing the same social ties within their better relocation
neighborhoods.
There are several patterns that reoccur within the cited studies and similar ones.
The Copenhagen study as well as Dixon’s analysis of gentrification in Chicago both do
10

not specify what constitutes a better or worse neighborhood. Freeman (2006), Schill and
Nathan (1983), and HUD (1981) focus on analysis of interviews or percentage
differences rather than conducting econometric analysis. Schill and Nathan’s (1983) and
HUD’s (1981) studies only cover instances of gentrification up until the 1980s. Finally,
Vigdor’s research (2001), which is most similar of the papers mentioned to the research
conducted in this study, only provides original research on the Boston area. By using geocoded PSID and decennial census data, extending the study into the 1990s, performing
empirical econometric analysis, and utilizing clear measures of neighborhood
characteristics, this study fills a gap in the literature by providing a more comprehensive
and nationally representative analysis than past research has, and attempts to quantify
many things that were qualitatively analyzed in past research.
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY
In order to determine whether low-income residents are better or worse off after
being displaced by gentrification one must create a model that specifies their residential
location decision. In this study, the term “household” includes any person living in the
home of the reference person. Urban area refers to the larger metropolitan area, and
encompasses the neighborhoods of low-income and high-income households. Central city
refers to the core of the city, where low-income households are assumed to locate under
the theory of spatial mismatch because of their need to utilize public transportation in
order to travel to work and school (Wilson 1987). I use a discrete choice framework with
general representations of household utility, which is based on Kent’s (2008) approach
for modeling school district choice, and Vigdor’s (2001) discussion of the driving forces
of gentrification and relocation decisions in the face of gentrification.
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A. Household Location Decision
I assume a household will choose to live in the neighborhood in which net
benefits are maximized. The term net benefits refers to the total value generated from
living in a neighborhood minus the total cost of living in that neighborhood. Value
represents the real dollar value of benefits from living in a specific neighborhood. While
the costs of a neighborhood (rent, cost of transportation to work or school, etc,) are
obvious, the concept of the value of a neighborhood can be less intuitive. The real dollar
value of a neighborhood speaks to the monetary amount one gains from living in one
neighborhood rather than another. For example, if living in one neighborhood exposes a
resident to peers with better job connections, and thus the resident obtains a better paying
job than they would have held in a different neighborhood, then any gains from this job
that are over the gains from the job they would have otherwise held are considered to be
part of the neighborhood’s real dollar value. Things like not having to get a car alarm
because the neighborhood is safe enough to not require such precautions are also
considered in the value of the neighborhood. In order to maximize value, V, a household
chooses a neighborhood so that Vi > Vj; for all neighborhoods i, j. A household chooses
neighborhood i if:
[Vi(nbhoodcsmpi, othercsmp)-Ci] > [Vj(nbhoodcsmpj, othercsmp)-Cj] (1)
where nbhoodcsmp represents neighborhood consumption, and othercsmp represents
other consumption. C represents the total cost of living in the neighborhood and the cost
of relocating to that neighborhood if it is not the neighborhood in which the household
currently resides. The total cost of living in a neighborhood contains the cost of housing,
as well as how much the household spends on essentials such as food and other staples,
12

and transportation costs to school or work. That is, I assume that households will do
everyday shopping within their neighborhoods, and therefore the cost they incur from
purchasing these goods is dependent on the typical costs of these goods in stores in their
neighborhoods. Transportation costs may vary based upon how many public
transportation options the neighborhood contains, and whether living in the neighborhood
necessitates owning a car, as it would if an individual were living in the outer part of the
urban area but working in the central city. The cost of relocating can be substantial, since
in addition to the large cost of moving physical possessions, there is a large psychic cost
associated with leaving behind the old neighborhood, where one is accustomed to the
people, schools, stores, etc. This relocation cost is included in the cost of a neighborhood.
Specifically, the cost of relocating to neighborhood j is included in the cost of j if the
resident does not already reside in neighborhood j. A household should choose to move
only if the value of moving exceeds the cost of moving.
This study is mostly concerned with the effects of people and social networks
within a neighborhood on displaced residents who relocate into that neighborhood, so the
model will focus on neighborhood and peer effects. All neighborhood-specific
characteristics (such as public transportation options, the number of schools, the types of
commercial business in the area) other than neighborhood effects are factors of other
consumption. Rewriting equation (1), a household’s net benefits are now represented as a
function of neighborhood effects (which is represented by nbhoodeffects) and all other
consumption, so that the household chooses to live in neighborhood i if:
[Vi(nbhoodeffectsi, othercsmp)-Ci] > [Vj(nbhoodeffectsj, othercsmp)-Cj],
∀ i,j neighborhoods
13

(2)

B. Neighborhood Effects Production Function
Neighborhood

effects

are

a

function

of

peer

effects,

collective

efficacy/socialization, social ties, and institutional resources (Freeman 2006). Research
finds conflicting results about the effect of peers and social networks within a
neighborhood upon other members of the neighborhood. The following six neighborhood
characteristics are identified by Ginther et al. (2000) as measures that are frequently
shown to have an effect on children’s outcomes in neighborhood effects studies: (1)
percent of persons white (percwhite), (2) percent of families with a female head
(percfemhead), (3) percent of persons who are low income (percpov), (4) percent of
persons who are high income (perchighinc), (5) percent of young adults who are dropouts
(percdropout), and (6) average adult unemployment rate (unemprate). Though Ginther
(2000) finds that the significance of these variables on children’s outcomes decreases as
family variables are taken into account, these variables are nonetheless the ones most
commonly seen as significant in affecting future outcomes of children. Since this study is
concerned with adult outcomes, rather than children’s outcomes, family variables should
also be less significant, which may in turn suggest that neighborhoods play a larger role
as one moves from childhood to adulthood. Taking these factors into account, a
household chooses neighborhood i if:
[Vi(f(percwhitei, percfemheadi, percpovi,
percperchighinci, percdropouti, unempratei), othercsmp)-Ci]
>
[Vj(f(percwhitej, percfemheadj, percpovj,
perchighincj, percdropoutj, unempratej), othercsmp)-Cj],
14

∀ i,j neighborhoods

(3)

C. Initial Equilibrium
In the pre-gentrification equilibrium, low-income and high-income households
reside in different neighborhoods due to the segregating forces of neighborhood effects
and other factors, particularly transportation options (Wilson 1987). Low-income
households locate within the central city because of their inability to afford cars, and the
availability of public transportation in the central city. High-income households locate
largely in the outer parts of the urban area, from where they may either commute by
automobile to work or choose to work away from the central city. Under this equilibrium,
the differences between the values of benefits across households are explained by both
the neighborhood and other inputs, as low-income households consume worse
neighborhood effects and fewer other goods when compared to higher-income
households (i.e. low-income households need car alarms, and high-income households
get to find out about better jobs). Assuming a perfectly competitive housing market, each
household maximizes its value. In this Pareto optimal condition, no household can
increase its net value. Moving to another neighborhood is not an option, because to do so
would be to decrease the net value of another household. Therefore, for any household
[Vi(f(percwhitei, percfemheadi, percpovi,
percperchighinci, percdropouti, unempratei), othercsmp)-Ci]
=
[Vj(f(percwhitej, percfemheadj, percpovj,
perchighincj, percdropoutj, unempratej), othercsmp)-Cj],
∀ i,j neighborhoods
15

(4)

D. Gentrification
Gentrification can be either income-driven or preference-driven. As an example,
income-driven gentrification can be driven by a technological advancement in a specific
urban area, which increases the productivity of highly-skilled workers while not affecting
the productivity of low-skill workers. I assume highly-skilled workers are high-income,
while low-skill workers are low-income. The increase in productivity causes an increase
in wages for highly-skilled workers, and this in turn increases highly-skilled workers’
willingness to pay to live in the urban area, so they choose to move, and disrupt former
neighborhood demographics, in order to maximize their net value. In the case of
preference-driven gentrification, high-income households start considering locating
closer to the city center more attractive. This can be because neighborhood and housing
characteristics in the city center become attractive to the wealthy, or because a decrease
in childbearing decreases the demand for space among high-income workers, or because
of any number of other reasons that would shift preferences. In any case, their willingness
to pay to live in the urban area increases, and they move in order to maximize their net
value. In both preference-driven and income-driven gentrification, the distribution of the
six neighborhood effects variables changes across neighborhoods as high-income
households relocate. Thus, for any low-income household
[Vi(f(percwhitei, percfemheadi, percpovi,
percperchighinci, percdropouti, unempratei), othercsmp)-Ci]
≠
[Vj(f(percwhitej, percfemheadj, percpovj,
perchighincj, percdropoutj, unempratej), othercsmp)-Cj],
16

∀ i, j neighborhoods

(5)

The shock of gentrification on the initial equilibrium disrupts a low-income
household’s maximization of net value, as low-income households are no longer in a
Pareto optimal situation because the preferences of low-income households presumably
do not shift to perfectly offset the changes in preferences of high-income households.
That is, low-income households do not necessarily prefer to trade places with highincome households who now prefer to live in low-income neighborhoods (Vigdor 2001).
Denoting their original neighborhood as o (for original), a neighborhood with more
positive neighborhood effects as b (for better), and a neighborhood with more negative
neighborhood effects as w (for worse), low-income households must choose which of the
following optimizes their value in the face of gentrification:
Vo(f(percwhiteo, percfemheado, percpovo, percperchighinco, percdropouto, unemprateo),
othercsmp)-Co

Vb(f(percwhiteb, percfemheadb, percpovb, percperchighincb, percdropoutb, unemprateb),
othercsmp)-Cb

Vw(f(percwhitew, percfemheadw, percpovw, percperchighincw, percdropoutw, unempratew),
othercsmp)-Cw
(6)
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E. New Equilibrium
In order to once again maximize their net benefits, low-income households react
to gentrification by either moving until they once again maximize the net benefits of their
location or remaining in their original neighborhoods. Equilibrium is reached when all
households are maximizing their value and garnering the neighborhood effects they
desire.
Since gentrification is a purely urban phenomenon, and past studies have shown
that the displaced do not locate away from the central city, it is reasonable to assume that
in a model of residential location decision in the face of gentrification, all central city
households have access to public transportation, and thus all central city households have
access to educational institutions and workplaces throughout the city (Lyons 1996; Schill
and Nathan 1983). If value generated from transportation is equal for all low-income
households who face the potential of displacement across the central city, and
transportation options allow access to jobs and schools across the central city, then these
characteristics can be removed from the residential location decision model for lowincome households, with the exception of specific cases in which low-income households
may consider locating out of the central city.
In the case of income-driven gentrification, low-income households may become
displaced. If a poor household’s cost of moving is zero, and the household can derive the
same net value from another area, and household mobility only has effects within the
housing market, then the household moves out of the urban area. As mentioned in section
(D), this is unlikely to be the case, and the assumptions of a zero moving cost and a lack
of effects from housing mobility are unrealistic (Vigdor 2001).
18

When a low-income household faces moving costs that are so large that they
prohibit moving, it affects the net value of its alternative relocation neighborhood, as the
cost to move is so great as to exceed the value. Low-income households who rent their
housing lose net value in this situation, as the cost of living in their neighborhood
increases. Low-income households who own homes may experience increases in costs if
property taxes and insurance premia increase, but may also gain the benefit of an increase
in housing equity as gentrification occurs, so the overall effect on net value is unclear for
these households (Vigdor 2001).
The two aforementioned situations present what happens to low-income
households in the extreme cases of no moving costs or completely prohibitive moving
costs. In actuality, low-income households are likely to end up somewhere between these
two extremes, with some households becoming displaced to better or worse
neighborhoods, and others choosing to increase their willingness to pay in order to
remain in their original neighborhood (Vigdor 2001).
Preference-driven gentrification can cause the previously mentioned outcomes as
well, but also presents a situation in which low-income households can definitely
increase their net value. For this to occur, high-income households must have an increase
in their willingness to pay for housing close to the central city, as well as a decrease in
their willingness to pay for housing away from the central city. This causes there to be
more land area where low-income households have a higher willingness to pay than highincome households. This can end in low-income households moving to better areas for a
lower cost, since demand for housing in these formerly high-income neighborhoods has
decreased. Depending on whether this demand for housing decreases significantly
19

enough, housing prices throughout the urban area may drop, which would result in
increases in net value for renters, and once again ambiguous effects for homeowners
(Vigdor 2001).
In both types of gentrification, even if the low-income household desires to stay,
other forces may cause it to relocate. Eviction and harassment by landlords increase the
cost of staying in the original neighborhood, and may make the cost of relocating appear
insignificant in comparison. Conversely, low-income households may decide to remain in
the neighborhood if gentrification creates new opportunities in the job market, increases
the amount of public services available through increased tax collection from highincome gentrifiers, or directly improves neighborhood quality. Overall, theory cannot
predict clearly whether a low-income household will relocate to a better or worse
neighborhood, or choose to remain in its original neighborhood.
F. Estimation Strategy
In order to determine whether a person is better or worse off, one must choose a
quantifiable measure of the value of benefits of a neighborhood. Ideally, a well-being
variable would capture the amount that individuals gain from social service and
government assistance programs, the wages and incomes of individuals, and any changes
among other factors that are likely to change as neighborhood effects occur.
Wage and income are the two measures of well-being used in this study.2 While
this is not ideal, income and wage do encompass many other factors that neighborhood
effects may affect. For example, if a low-income individual encounters more collegeeducated individuals in the neighborhood they relocate to, and chooses to pursue higher
2

I also attempted to use a ratio of rent to income as a measure of well-being. However, because of high
non-response rates in the PSID, there were too few observations remaining after the addition of a rent
variable to allow for meaningful analysis.
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education, resulting in a diploma they had not previously held, this should then result in
an increase in wage and income as well. A displaced individual may also be informed of
the benefits of joining a union by better-informed residents in their new neighborhood.
On the other hand, moving into a neighborhood with worse neighborhood effects could
cause an individual to have to devote more time to protecting their housing and thus
detract from time they can spend pursuing measures to increase their income. Relocating
to a new neighborhood can also have effects not captured in income changes, such as the
psychic effects of changing social ties, and my analysis cannot quantify or account for
these factors, unless they affect the individual’s income or wage, and even then these
factors will not be distinguishable from other factors.
To estimate the effect of relocating on income and wage, one must look at the
difference between the income level and wage of the relocated person several years after
relocation and the income level they had in their former neighborhood. I choose to look at
the individual two years after they have relocated to a new neighborhood, as this seems
like an appropriate amount of time to garner new neighborhood effects, and a person is
unlikely to relocate again within two years. The dependent variable in the ideal regression
equation measures income or wage changes over the two years in natural log form. The
natural logs of income and wage are taken because these allow one to see the percent
change in income rather than the change in income levels. The percent change is
preferable since low-income residents by definition have very low incomes and wages,
and thus what may seem like a small change in income or wage for most people may
indeed be a large change for a low-income person.
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Since the dependent variable is change in income or wages, the independent
variables should be changes in income or wage determinants. Traditional Mincerian wage
determinants are age, age-squared (for the U-shape relationship with wage), sex, race,
union membership, education, industry, and occupation. Age and age-squared are
included as levels rather than differences because all residents age the same amount over
two years, and thus there is no variation in the variables. Sex and race are included not as
changes, but as levels, as well, since they would otherwise be differenced out. While
variables like sex or race do not change over time, they may have significant effects on
the rate at which an individual’s income increases. That is to say, white males may be
more easily promoted or otherwise encounter income increases more than typically
disadvantaged groups.
A dummy variable equal to one if a household is displaced, and equal to zero
otherwise is added. A dummy variable equal to one if a household lived in a gentrifying
tract in the base year, and equal to zero otherwise is also added. The two aforementioned
variables are interacted to create a variable equal to one if a household was displaced
from a gentrifying tract in the base year. Variables accounting for the differences in the
six neighborhood effects variables between the gentrifying neighborhood and the
relocation neighborhood are included. These six variables are meant to check whether a
change in neighborhood effects has a significant effect on changes in income or wage.
These six terms are then interacted with the displacement and gentrification dummies in
order to see the effects of various neighborhood effects on residents who are displaced by
gentrification. The ideal guiding equation appears as follows, using wage as the
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dependent variable, though the log difference of income levels would be used as a
dependent variable as well:
ln(NewWage) - ln(OldWage) =
α + β1Age + β2Age2 + β3Sex + β4Race + β5ChangeinUnion + β6ChangeinEducation +
β7ChangeinIndustry + β8ChangeinOccupation + β9Displaced+
β10FromGentrifyingNeighborhood + β11Displaced*FromGentrifyingNeighborhood +
β12ChangeinPercentofWhitePersonsBetweenNeighborhoods +
β13ChangeinPercentofFamilieswithFemaleHeadBetweenNeighborhoods +
β14ChangeinPercentofPersonsinPovertyBetweenNeighborhoods +
β15ChangeinPercentofPersonswithHighIncomeBetweenNeighborhoods +
β16ChangeinPercentofDropoutsBetweenNeighborhoods +
β17ChangeinUnemploymentRateBetweenNeighborhoods +
β18Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofWhitePersonsBetweeNeighborhoods +
β19Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofFamilieswithFemaleHeadBetweenNeighborhoods +
β20Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofPersonsinPovertyBetweenNeighborhoods +
β21Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofPersonswithHighIncomeBetweenNeighborhoods+
β22Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofDropoutsBetweenNeighborhoods +
β23Displa*Gent*ChangeinUnemploymentRateBetweenNeighborhoods + εi
(7)
where

Displa

is

notation

for

Displaced

and

Gent

is

notation

for

FromGentrifyingNeighborhood, and variables with asterisks are interaction terms. No
prediction is being made as to whether displaced residents will be better or worse off, so
no predictions of the signs of the coefficients of these variables are made.
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IV. SUMMARY STATISTICS
A. Data
This study uses data from the geo-coded Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
in conjunction with decennial census data.3 The geo-codes are tract level and used to link
the PSID to census data.4 The PSID is a longitudinal, nationally representative study that
has been conducted since 1968, and contains social, health, and economic information on
nearly 9,000 families and the individuals within those families, residing in the United
States. Because the PSID follows the same individuals and families over years, it can be
used to observe relocation from one neighborhood to another (i.e. when faced with
gentrification). Moreover, when the PSID is linked to geographical data, one can observe
how these individuals’ and families’ statuses change as the characteristics of their
neighborhoods change.
This study uses an extraction of data from the 1990 Census of Population and
Housing (Tape Files 3A and 3B) collected by Adams (2000) to determine neighborhood
characteristics. This dataset includes over 120 census variables and over 100 variables
that were derived from those 120. These variables can be linked to many levels of
geographic areas, including tracts, and contain information on ethnicity, family
structures, income, education, labor force activity, and housing.
The following six variables from Adams’ (2000) dataset are used to measure
neighborhood characteristics of each tract contained in the PSID data: (1) percentage of
3

The PSID is the most often used data set for national studies of gentrification that require longitudinally
linked observations of residents. The American Housing Survey (AHS) is a popular alternative, but since it
is longitudinally linked by housing unit, not household, it is not ideal for this paper. Data sets detailing
smaller geographic areas are also often used for gentrification research, though these often focus on
neighborhoods specifically identified as gentrifying, and by definition offer fewer observations for analysis.
4
Census tracts are small, relatively stable geographic areas delineated by the census that typically contain
between 2,500 and 8,000 residents. Tracts are meant to follow the same boundaries as recognized
neighborhoods.

24

persons white, (2) percentage of families with female head, (3) percentage of all persons
in households with incomes below federal poverty threshold, (4) percentage of families
with 1989 incomes greater than $50,000, (5) percentage of young adults who have not
graduated from high school and are not in school, and (6) adult unemployment rate x100.
These six variables are meant to mimic those that Ginther et al. (2000) identify as being
consistently significant across neighborhoods effects studies.
The PSID data and Adams’ (2000) data are used in conjunction with 1990 and
2000 Census of Population and Housing data to determine which tracts/neighborhoods
have undergone gentrification in the 1990s. Data from the Neighborhood Change
Database (a GeoLytics product) are used to determine how tract definitions have changed
between 1990 and 2000. Due to data limitations, this study utilizes only those census
tracts whose boundaries did not change and were not renamed between 1990 and 2000.
Thus, roughly 49 percent of tracts are represented in the analysis.
The unit of analysis in the study is the individual who describes him or herself as
the household head in the PSID, since this is the individual about whom the PSID collects
the most data and the only household member for whom the PSID describes geographical
movement. Each census tract will be considered a neighborhood.5
B. Variable Specification
Table 1 in the appendix contains information on variables used in regressions,
their notations, and the data sources from which they come. The PSID contains direct
data on income, wage, age, sex, race, union membership, education, industry, occupation,
5

This may bias results if a tract identified as gentrifying is larger or smaller than the actual area that is
gentrifying. That is, those residents on the fringe of the tract in either direction may not be accurately
represented. Since census tracts are meant to represent commonly recognized neighborhoods, and
gentrification is usually contained within neighborhoods exhibiting specific characteristics, this is not a
large concern, and no corrective measure is taken.
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area of residency, and moving. Since the PSID is a panel, and longitudinally linked,
differences between these variables from year to year can be calculated for individuals. In
many cases, the PSID does not re-ask questions whose answers typically do not change
over years, but carries them forward from year to year. Thus, some variation in variables
like education may not be captured unless the head chooses to state that he/she pursued
further education. While it would be ideal to difference all independent variables for
which it is possible, because of this limitation, no person-specific right-hand side
variables will be differenced. That is, age, age-squared, sex, race, union status, education
level, industry, and occupation will reflect the values for these variables in the period
after relocation, rather than reflecting the change in these variables that has occurred
since gentrification. This will affect results since differences in these variables would
correspond more appropriately with dependent variables that are expressed in differences.
Particularly, since neighborhood characteristics variables are expressed in differences, it
may be the case that these difference variables will pick up changes that should be
attributed to changes in the demographic variables that are expressed in levels. However,
since there would be minimal variation in demographic variables if they were differenced
because of the re-asking limitation, it is more appropriate to use levels rather than lowvariation differences.
Freeman’s (2005) framework is used to determine whether a neighborhood was
gentrifying in the base period or not. As he states, in order to be considered gentrifying, a
neighborhood must meet the following criteria:
1. Be located in the central city at the beginning of the intercensal period.
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2. Have a median income less than the median (40th percentile) for that
metropolitan area at the beginning of the intercensal period.
3. Have a proportion of housing built within the past 20 years lower than the
proportion found at the median (40th percentile) for the respective
metropolitan area.
4. Have a percentage increase in educational attainment greater than the median
increase in educational attainment for that metropolitan area.
5. Have an increase in real housing prices during the intercensal period (Freeman
2005).
The first qualification for gentrification speaks to the fact that gentrification is a
purely urban phenomenon. The second qualification presents a rather high cutoff (40th
percentile) for income level in a gentrifying neighborhood, but this is mostly done
because the PSID does not contain enough observations of displaced residents living in
neighborhoods below this income level to provide meaningful regression results at lower
percentiles. The third qualification ensures there has been disinvestment in the
neighborhood for the past two decades, thus allowing for housing values to have fallen,
and providing gentrifiers with a reinvestment opportunity. The fourth qualification
ensures that the neighborhood is indeed moving from a low-income (and thus likely lowskill and low-educational level) to a high-income (and thus likely high-skill and highincome level) neighborhood because of in-movers (who are assumed to have higher
levels of educational attainment than people already residing within the neighborhood),
and not because of other forces that may be generally increasing educational attainment
throughout the central city. The fifth qualification ensures that in-movers are reinvesting
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in the neighborhood, specifically in housing. While this may seem like a very strict
definition of gentrification that is contingent on many variables, it is helpful in ensuring
that instances of gentrification are not overstated.
The response to the “Why moved?” variable in the PSID is used to determine if a
person was displaced. The responses of “Response to outside events (involuntary
reasons): HU [housing unit] coming down; being evicted; armed services, etc.; health
reasons; divorce; retiring because of health” or “Ambiguous or mixed reasons: to save
money; all my old neighbors moved away; retiring (NA why)” qualify an individual as
displaced. This tends to overstate displacement since moving because of divorce or the
armed services, etc. is not necessarily the type of displacement that would be related with
gentrification. The data do not offer any way to differentiate these reasons for moving
from more clearly displacement-related reasons. A resident has to be displaced from a
neighborhood characterized as gentrifying in order to be considered displaced by
gentrification.
C. Summary Statistics
Table 2 shows the means of variables used in this sample as compared to national
means of those same or similar variables. The summary statistics collected show that the
sample used for analysis has more generally disadvantaged individuals than what would
have been nationally representative. The PSID sample also shows that typically 20.71%
of people moved over two-year time spans, while the census shows that 41.23% of people
in the United States moved between 1985 and 1990, a five-year time span. Extrapolating
that since 20.71% of PSID observations moved in a two-year period, roughly 51.78%
(two-and-half times as many) would move in a five-year period, assuming no repeat
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movers, it becomes clear that the PSID may be slightly over-representative of movers.
This may mean that instances of being displaced by gentrification are also overstated.
However, since it is likely that some movers are repeat movers, the PSID percent of
movers is likely closer to the national average than the extrapolation suggests.
Tables 3 through 9 describe additional summary statistics. The income minimum
of 1 represents those who are “not working for money.” The 1 is recoded from 0 in order
for observations not to be dropped when using the natural log form. The same is done for
the wage variable.
Coding for education changed during the sample years, and takes on values of 017, with 0 meaning no education, 12 meaning completion of high school, 16 meaning
completion of college, and 17 meaning any educational attainment beyond undergraduate
education. Thus, education is measured in years up until the value of 16, after which 17 is
used to represent any education beyond college.
Sex is coded as 0 for males and 1 for females, so the mean of 0.35 means that
only 35% of observations are female. This is because the PSID prefers for the household
head to be male and will call a female’s significant other or any male residing in the
household the “householder” and the female the “wife” even when the householder has
only been a member of the household for a brief time (sometimes only several months).
Unfortunately, moving information is not collected on the “wife,” so a householder can
report on his moving into the home, but this does not necessarily mean that the “wife” did
not already reside in the home prior to him. There is also no way to easily determine
whether the “wife” a householder reports for one year is the same as the “wife” reported
in other years, which is another reason why “wives” are not used in the analysis. All of
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this suggests that single mothers who are displaced by gentrification may not be
adequately represented in the sample, and that no conclusions can be drawn about
whether displacement by gentrification affect males and females differently.
The sample of households in this paper also seems to be over-representative of the
unemployed and those who are not in the labor force, as 31.12% of householders report
that they are “Not working for money now.” While the corresponding national percentage
is 38.80%, it is notable that the national sample has more women, a higher percentage of
non-working age individuals, and a lower level of educational attainment. Thus, it is
understandable that the national sample has such a large percentage of individuals who
are either not in the labor force or unemployed. The PSID sample consists of household
heads, who are mostly working age males, and thus the 31.12% of individuals not
working for money is abnormally high. This means that residents displaced from
gentrifying neighborhoods are being compared in large part to other disadvantaged
residents in this study.
Comparing observations of those displaced by gentrification with all displaced
persons, all movers, and all observations, it is clear that those displaced by gentrification
have the lowest incomes and wages. Notably, those displaced by gentrification also have
the highest percent increase in income two years after relocation. Looking at the changes
in neighborhood characteristics variables, while the changes for all movers and all
observations are not consistently better or worse, the summary statistics on all displaced
residents and residents displaced by gentrification show that almost each neighborhood
characteristic shows improvement after relocation. This shows that displaced residents
are moving to better neighborhoods. Coupled with the increase in income for residents
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displaced by gentrification, this suggests that positive changes in neighborhood
characteristics could be significantly affecting income. Changes in wage are much less
dramatic for displaced observations, and do not show any consistent patterns across the
various groupings of observations.
The mean for moved is 0.21, meaning that 21% of observations in the entire
sample moved. Six percent of the entire sample was displaced, and 1% was displaced
specifically by gentrification. Looking at only observations that moved in the sample
period, 30% were displaced, and 4% were displaced specifically by gentrification.
Twelve percent of all displaced observations were displaced by gentrification.

V. ANALYSIS
A. Estimation Issues
Initial regressions shows that Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) are high, with
many variables above 10 (see Tables 25 and 26), but all variables are theoretically
important, and thus no corrective measure is taken. Initial regressions also show that
heteroskedasticity is significant, so robust t-statistics are used in all regressions. Dummy
variables are created for race, industry, and occupation, for which coefficients and
standard errors are reported in separate regression result tables. F tests are also performed
on these dummy variables to observe total significance of race, industry, and occupation.
While one would also think that there may be endogeneity between the dependent
variables of income and wage, and changes in neighborhood characteristics, this may not
be the case in this study because of the way in which variables are specified. That is, one
would expect that as a person’s income increases, they might relocate to a better
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neighborhood. Similarly, a decrease in income might lead to relocation to a worse
neighborhood. The fact that income and wage could be affecting neighborhood choice in
this way could make it potentially difficult to separate out effects that neighborhood
characteristics are having on income or wage. Differencing wage and income, and
including neighborhood characteristics should do away with some of the potential for
endogeneity. The income and wages that are stated for the base year represent incomes
and wages at the time of relocation, and incomes and wages in the relocation
neighborhood are incomes and wages two years after relocation. Since it is unlikely that
one would move simply because they expect a change in income or wages in the near
future (a situation in which a change in wage or income would be driving a change in
neighborhood), it is unlikely that income and wage changes are driving neighborhood
choices in this model. An example of a situation in which one would relocate because of
the expectation of higher income is a recent college graduate moving to a neighborhood
where their neighborhood quality will be a function of the starting wage they expect.
Being displaced, by definition, also means that a change in one’s income are wage is not
the primary driving force behind relocating from one neighborhood to another.
Even if a recent change in income or wages is considered in the neighborhood
relocation decision, the fact that two years are spent in the relocation neighborhood
before the “after” income and wage data is collected means that the difference in income
or wages that is observed over this time is something that has occurred while in the new
neighborhood, and has not driven the household to yet another relocation. This means
that the observed change in income or wage is not causing the change in neighborhood
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characteristics. No corrective measure is taken for the potential for endogeneity, since
there is a lack of an available instrumental variable to be used as a proxy.
B. Estimation Equation
The following is the basic regression equation used for analysis:
ln(NewWage) - ln(OldWage) =
α + β1Age + β2Age2 + β3Sex + β4Race + β5Union + β6Education + β7Industry +
β8Occupation + β9Displaced+ β10FromGentrifyingTract +
β11Displaced*FromGentrifyingTract +
β12ChangeinPercentofWhitePersonsBetweenTracts +
β13ChangeinPercentofFamilieswithFemaleHeadBetweenTracts +
β14ChangeinPercentofPersonsinPovertyBetweenTracts +
β15ChangeinPercentofPersonswithHighIncomeBetweenTracts +
β16ChangeinPercentofDropoutsBetweenTracts +
β17ChangeinUnemploymentRateBetweenTracts +
β18Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofWhitePersonsBetweenTracts +
β19Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofFamilieswithFemaleHeadBetweenTracts +
β20Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofPersonsinPovertyBetweenTracts +
β21Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofPersonswithHighIncomeBetweenTracts+
β22Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofDropoutsBetweenTracts +
β23Displa*Gent*ChangeinUnemploymentRateBetweenTracts + εi
(8)
The above is the regression equation used in regressions (vii) though (xii). Regressions (i)
through (vi) use a similar regression equation, though they do not include any
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neighborhood characteristics variables, or interaction terms that include neighborhood
characteristics variables. The first three regressions in each of these two sets are run on
changes in wage, while the last three are run on changes in income.
Regressions are run first on all observations in the sample, then all moved
observations, and finally all displaced observations. While past research typically focuses
on comparing those encountering gentrification to all movers, this study uses the
aforementioned three sample types in order to see whether those displaced by
gentrification fare differently compared to different reference groups. All samples are
limited to only residents living in urban areas in the gentrification period so that control
observations are as similar as possible to observations of residents displaced by
gnetrification.
Regressions (xiii) through (xviii) use the following regression equation:
ln(NewWage) =
α + β1Age + β2Age2 + β3Sex + β4Race + β5Union + β6Education + β7Industry +
β8Occupation + β9Displaced+ β10FromGentrifyingTract +
β11Displaced*FromGentrifyingTract +
β12ChangeinPercentofWhitePersonsBetweenTracts +
β13ChangeinPercentofFamilieswithFemaleHeadBetweenTracts +
β14ChangeinPercentofPersonsinPovertyBetweenTracts +
β15ChangeinPercentofPersonswithHighIncomeBetweenTracts +
β16ChangeinPercentofDropoutsBetweenTracts +
β17ChangeinUnemploymentRateBetweenTracts +
β18Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofWhitePersonsBetweenTracts +
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β19Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofFamilieswithFemaleHeadBetweenTracts +
β20Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofPersonsinPovertyBetweenTracts +
β21Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofPersonswithHighIncomeBetweenTracts+
β22Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofDropoutsBetweenTracts +
β23Displa*Gent*ChangeinUnemploymentRateBetweenTracts + εi
(9)
In this set of regressions, the first three regressions are run on wages in the time period
after relocation, while the last three are run on income in the time period after relocation.
The purpose of running regressions on post-relocation wages and incomes, rather than
differences in wages and incomes, is to ascertain how residents displaced by
gentrification fare in comparison to other people in samples, rather than in comparison to
how they themselves were doing two years prior, before gentrification and relocation.
Thus, the analysis in this study evaluates both how residents displaced by gentrification’s
well-beings vary across time, and solely in comparison to other groups of residents.
C. Main Results
Gentdispla and its interactions with neighborhood characteristics variables are the
variables of interest in these regressions. Thus, the interaction terms of neighborhood
characteristics with being displaced by gentrification are analyzed as two-way interaction
terms, where gentdispla is a dummy equal to 1 if a person was displaced by gentrification
in the base period.
Regressions (i) through (vi) do not include neighborhood characteristics, in an
attempt to see what the effects of being displaced by gentrification are when
neighborhood effects are not considered. Results from these regressions are reported in
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tables 10 through 14. In all six regressions presented in these tables, being displaced by
gentrification does not have significant effects on changes in income or wage over two
years. This suggests that on its own, being displaced by gentrification does not have a
significant impact on wage or income change. This may be because of a lack of social
mixing in relocation neighborhoods that would prevent neighborhood effects from being
absorbed, or because relocation neighborhoods are very similar to the neighborhoods that
people relocate from. It could also be that people displaced by gentrification move into
either better or worse neighborhoods, and when these two relocation options are not
separately analyzed, the results are clouded. It may also be that changes in neighborhood
demographics simply do not affect residents. Notably, many of the demographic
variables which are often significant in determining wages and income do not show up as
significant in these six regressions either. This may be because levels of demographic
variables are not ideal for describing changes in the dependent variables of changes in
wage and income. However, as discussed in the Summary Statistics section, no better
option exists for analysis with these data.
To check whether neighborhood effects are significant in determining outcomes
for residents displaced by gentrification, regressions (vii) through (xii) include the six
neighborhood characteristic variables and interactions of these terms with dummy
variables for displacement and gentrification. Results for these regressions are shown in
tables 15 through 19. Unlike in the previous set of regressions, being displaced by
gentrification does have significant effects in these regressions, namely when
neighborhood effects are considered. This shows that differences between relocation

36

neighborhoods can account for some of the impact of being displaced by gentrification on
changes in wage and income.
In regressions (vii), (viii) and (ix), being displaced by gentrification has a small,
positive effect, though it is insignificant. The coefficient on gentdispladrop in regression
(vii) is -0.028, meaning that when looking at a sample of all residents, for every
percentage point increase in dropouts between the gentrifying tract and the tract to which
the resident relocates, the wage of a resident displaced by gentrification significantly
decreases by 2.8%, thus taking away from some of the original small positive change
caused simply by being displaced by gentrification. In regression (viii), the interpretation
of gentdispladrop is the same, except that the decrease is 2.9% rather than 2.8%, and the
sample only includes movers. In regression (ix), which uses a sample of only displaced
residents, the decrease is 2.7%. In the regressions in this set that use changes in wage as
the dependent variable, gentdispladrop is the only variable to show up as significant out
of the neighborhood characteristic variables for residents displaced by gentrification. This
suggests that of all neighborhood characteristics, the percent of dropouts has the largest
effect on the well-being of residents displaced by gentrification. It is likely that school
dropouts also have other negative characteristics that may be negatively affecting wages.
It should be noted, though, that in economic terms, a 2.8 or 2.9 or 2.7 percent change in
wage is not very significant.
Regressions (x) and (xi)—which have changes in income as the dependent
variable, and are run on all observations and all moved observations, respectively—have
a greater number of significant results for interaction terms of neighborhood effects and
being displaced by gentrification. Between these two regressions, all six of the
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neighborhood effects variables are shown to have significant effects on the income of
residents displaced by gentrification.
In regressions (x) and (xi), all six interaction terms are significant. In regression
(xii), gentdisplahigh is significant. The coefficient on gentdisplawhite is negative in
regressions (x) and (xi). The coefficient on gentdisplapov is positive in these regressions,
as is the coefficient on gentdisplaunemp. All of these results are not consistent with
theory, as an increase in white people across neighborhoods should lead to income gains,
while increases in poverty or unemployment should decrease income. Since the
magnitudes of gentdispla are so large and negative, and the magnitudes of the
neighborhood interaction terms are so large, it is likely that these results are not very
meaningful, and that the data could benefit from being disaggregated by whether the
person relocated to a better or worse neighborhood. The coefficients on gentdisplafem are
negative and significant in regressions (x) and (xi), as are the coefficients on
gentdispladrop. The coefficients on gentdisplahigh are positive and significant in
regressions (x), (xi), and (xii). The results on these three interaction terms are consistent
with theory, as an increase in female-headed households or dropouts should cause income
decreases, while an increase in the amount of high-income households should cause
income gains. However, the magnitudes on all of these variables are obscenely high,
suggesting once again that the data should be disaggregated and otherwise improved
upon.
Finally, it is notable that in none of these twelve regressions does being displaced
by gentrification without the consideration of neighborhood effects have any negative or
positive effects on wage or income or changes in the two. This suggests that any
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differences in income or wage that residents encounter are functions of differences in
neighborhood characteristics, thus lending support to the theory of neighborhood effects.
This also means that people displaced by gentrification are experiencing at least some
social mixing, as they are evidently influenced by their neighbors.
In summary, while simply being displaced by gentrification does not have a
significant effect on how much one’s income or wage changes over the two years after
leaving the gentrifying neighborhood, specific neighborhood characteristics can offset or
worsen the core effect of being displaced by gentrification. However, because of data
limitations, this paper does not accurately address what neighborhood characteristics are
important in determining the outcomes of residents displaced by gentrification, as many
variables are largely out of line with theory.
D. Robustness
To check the robustness of my results, I use the natural log of post-gentrification
relocation wage and the natural log of post-gentrification income as dependent variables,
rather than differences. Results for robustness regressions are reported in tables 20
through 24. These results measure how much an individual who was displaced by
gentrification’s wage or income is different from an individual’s who was not. That is,
the incomes and wages of residents who were displaced by gentrification are being
compared to those of people who were not, in the post period.
In this set of six regressions, the effect of being displaced by gentrification is
never significant and always negative, though it varies in magnitude. The only
neighborhood effects measures that show up as significant are gentdispladrop and
gentdisplapov.
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The coefficient on gentdisplapov is significant and positive in regression (xvi),
which looks at a sample of all observations and has income as the dependent variable.
The coefficient is 0.489, suggesting that for every one percentage point increase in people
living in poverty across the two neighborhoods, a resident displaced by gentrification will
experience an income that is 48.9% higher than the income of other people living in the
neighborhood. This makes sense if residents who are displaced by gentrification move to
severely impoverished neighborhoods where their incomes are drastically higher than the
incomes of other residents of the neighborhood. This supports the idea that residents
displaced by gentrification can move to much worse neighborhoods. This only makes
sense if the income of residents displaced by gentrification starts out higher than the
average residents of an impoverished neighborhood when they relocate there initially,
and manages to remain much higher two years later. It is more difficult to contemplate
how moving to a more impoverished neighborhood could cause one’s income to increase
so significantly. If the former explanation suffices, then this supports the idea that there is
very little social mixing between residents displaced by gentrification and their new
neighbors, as they are not being affected by the low incomes of their neighbors.
The coefficients on gentdispladrop are significant in regressions (xiii), (xiv),
(xiv), and (xvii), and consistently negative, though they vary in magnitude. This all
suggests that if a resident displaced by gentrification moves to a neighborhood with more
dropouts, their income will be significantly lower than that of residents who were not
displaced by gentrification. This suggests that social mixing does occur, as residents are
negatively influenced by their neighbors’ lack of education. That gentdispladrop is the
variable that most frequently shows up as significant suggests that the percent of dropouts
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in a neighborhood has the largest effect on in-movers, or that perhaps dropouts carry
many other negative characteristics as well. It should be noted that these neighborhood
characteristics are not positive enough to counteract the general negative effect of being
displaced by gentrification.
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Results presented in this paper suggest that residents displaced by gentrification
are relatively susceptible to differences in neighborhood characteristics between the
gentrifying neighborhoods they leave and the neighborhoods they relocate to. This
supports the theory of neighborhood effects, though not always in the direction predicted
by theory. This suggests that the data needs to be disaggregated based on whether
residents are moving to better or worse neighborhoods, and that more observations of
people displaced by gentrification are necessary.
Because this study covers 1990-1995, its findings are most relevant for cities that
experienced second-wave gentrification. The large majority of residents displaced by
gentrification in the various samples were from California, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, or
Pennsylvania, suggesting that the findings are most reflective of instances of
gentrification in these states.
In addition to disaggregating the sample and having more observations of
residents displaced by gentrification, future studies should control for the use of housing
vouchers and other housing assistance, to attempt to see how much this affects the
experience of residents displaced by gentrification. Future research would also benefit
from a refined and less ambiguous definition of displacement, the inclusion of a measure
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of neighborhood assets (such as number of schools, number of transportation options,
etc.), as well as an extended time frame.
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